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Abstract 
The main question of the proposed thesis is: what was the guiding principle 
of Japanese diplomacy during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the late 1990s and 
how did this principle help the countries in the region restore the Asian economy? 
My argument is that Japan responded to the Asian Financial Crisis as a 
middle power country and mediated opposing interests between Asia and the United 
States in order to stabilize the highly damaged Asian economy and prevent a 
recurrence of another crisis.  
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States led many countries 
in the free world by helping devastated nations, intentionally taking on more financial 
burden and using international institutions such as the IMF. On the other hand, 
demolished states such as West Germany and Japan enjoyed privilege to focus on 
economic reconstruction. Overall, a large number of countries became increasingly 
wealthier under Pax Americana. However, the US economic supremacy gradually 
declined inversely proportional to the rapid growth of recovering nations, benefiting 
from the US hegemony. In addition, more and more developing economies 
participated in international regimes. In order to reflect those new comers, a new 
concept was created as well as some actors in the Hegemonic Stability Theory, which 
is the middle power. 
 A middle power is an actor, which leads others as a facilitator and relatively 
stronger; but, cannot compete with great powers. As the middle power initiates and 
represents a coalition of willing in negotiation, it is required to arrange interests fairly 
among the members and with the hegemon, in other words, the United States. It is 
possible for the middle power to restrain and modify behaviors of the hegemonic 
power by taking advantage of collective bargaining power. However, it does not mean 
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that the middle power rejects cooperation with the hegemon because it needs the 
strongest country to achieve the goal of the group and its success depends on the 
stability of the economic status quo.  
 In order to argue that Japan was a middle power during the crisis, I 
demonstrate that Australian developed middle power diplomacy during the GATT 
Uruguay Round; but was not successful enough because it was not persistently fair 
between the United States and the European Community. I affirm that Japan played a 
role of middle power even though Japan failed to get its original plan supported to 
establish Asian Monetary Fund in the early stage of the Asian Financial Crisis. Japan 
was force to withdraw the plan after it was rejected but the retreat was just a tactical 
error. As a result of a series of initiatives as a whole package, Japan turned the 
misfortune into a blessing. The country worked together with the United States and 
utilized a new framework, ASEAN plus Three. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My main concern in the thesis is to understand the guiding principle of 
Japanese diplomacy during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the late 1990s and the 
role played by Japan to help the countries in the crisis. 
My argument is that Japan responded to the Asian Financial Crisis as a 
middle power country and mediated opposing interests between Asia and the United 
States after its original plan was turned down by the both of America and a few Asian 
nations. The cooperation contributed in order to stabilize the countries in the financial 
crisis and prevent a recurrence.  
Japan’s initial response to the crisis was to propose the establishment of a 
new financial institution, called an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). However, this was 
not backed by the United States in the early stage. In the subsequent period, Japan 
revised the original plan, abandoned the idea of a formal institution, but slowly put 
together a set of mechanisms to help countries in future crises. This willingness to 
contribute positively to the crisis management is part of Japan’s middle power 
diplomacy. 
My thesis will explore the principles behind the Japanese foreign economic 
policies in the late 1990s when an unprecedented wave of economic crisis struck Asia 
in July 1997 after years of epoch-making development. By the 1970s Japan was 
already being heralded as one of the leading and most dynamic economies in the 
world. Regionally, some Asian nations emulated its developmental path and followed 
the Japanese economic model closely. Drifte notes that “learning from Japan has in 
many countries become a motto to overcome industrial decline.”1 In a few short years, 
countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan and subsequently 
                                                  
1 Drifte, Reinhard. “Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”. ST. Martin’s Press, INC. 1996. 
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Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Asia’s MIT) had emerged, as Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs). Internationally, however, Japan attracted 
considerable criticism as a global free rider, not playing a role commensurate to its 
level of economic development. Things changed though with the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. It shook Thailand in July and spread like a contagion swiftly and 
unpredictably to South Korea and Indonesia. As Gilpin explains that irrationality, in 
other words, euphoria and financial crisis are inherently two sides of the same coin, 
"the East Asian financial crisis and its subsequent global financial turmoil did indeed 
closely follow Minsky's" model of financial crisis presuming that they are induced by 
uncertainty, speculation, and instability.”2 The AFC was, as Jomo indicates, a result 
of “the massive inflows of capital induced by the rapid economic growth of the region 
and the liberalized financial institutions.”3 During the bubble economy, everyone 
expected good growth to continue. Garnaut describes the euphoria that  
 
By the mid-1990s, the usual visitation of years of slower growth, let alone 
recession, was a distant memory. Financial institutions and the corporate sector 
more generally had been lulled into an unrealistic view of fluctuations in 
economic activity. Enterprises that gambled on continued expansion were 
consistently rewarded, increasing their command over assets and attracting 
reputations as competent investors. Large increases in stock market and real 
estate values inevitably came to contain elements of speculative excess.4  
 
Many experts attributed the AFC to inherently Asian business practices such as crony 
capitalism, and according to Sachs and Woo “official Washington, led by the IMF, 
proclaimed the crisis to be one of Asian capitalism, but the more generic character of 
                                                  
2 Gilpin, Robert. "Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order". Princeton 
University Press. 2001. 
3 Jomo Kwame Sundaram. “Obstacle to Implementing Lessons from the 1997-1998 East Asian Crises”. DESA 
Working Paper No.66. August 2008. 
4 Garnaut, Ross. “East Asia in Crisis –From being a miracle to needing one?”. Routledge. 1998. 
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the crisis became all too clear during 1998, as the crisis spread to Russia, South Africa 
and Latin America.”5  The impact of the crisis was deep, and drove Asian nations 
into a panic accentuated by the unprecedented economic development they had 
enjoyed. Few people foresaw the crisis,6 and neither the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) nor the Asian countries were ready to respond properly. In order for Japan to 
stabilize the Asian economy as a whole and protect Japanese business in Asia where 
“Japanese banks accounted for more than one-third of the total outstanding 
commercial bank debt,”7 Japan developed a series of economic policies to establish a 
framework to rescue damaged economies. As a consequence of Japan’s initiative and 
cooperation with other countries and international financial institutions, Japan made a 
contribution to speedy economic recovery.  
 
Table 1 
Financial panics and real GDP change (in percent) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 IMF's prediction of 1999  
Indonesia 8.2  8.0  4.6  -13.6  0.2  4.0  -3.4  
Malaysia 9.5  8.6  7.7  -7.5  5.4  5.5  -2.0  
South Korea 8.7  7.3  5.5  -5.8  9.4  6.3  -1.0  
Thailand 8.8  5.5  -0.4  -10.0  3.9  5.3  1.0  
Source: Edited by Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo 
 
We can detect a shift in Japanese foreign economic policy and the response 
toward the financial crisis in Asia. It is evident that Japan tried to rise above its 
much-criticized international status as a free-rider to play a more constructive role as 
                                                  
5 Sachs, Jeffrey. Woo, Wing Thye. “The Asian Financial Crisis- Lessons for a Resilient Asia”. The MIT Press. 
2000. 
6 Bhagwati, Jagdish. “Lessons from the East Asian Experience: Opening Address”. Conference Series; 
(proceedings), 2000, vol. 44, issue Jun. 
7 T. J. Pempel. “The politics of the Asian Economic Crisis”. Cornell University Press. 1999. 
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a middle power during the Asian Financial Crisis. The concept of middle power is not 
as well established in international relations literature as are, for instance from Lake’s 
classification, 8 categories like the hegemon, supporters, or free riders, but I will 
argue in my thesis that a middle power is a useful concept and can be applied to better 
understand Japan’s international role.   
The Japanese response during the Asian financial crisis, described by 
Kindleberger and Aliber,9 as the third financial crisis since the early 1980s following 
the first wave (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and ten other developing countries) and the 
second wave (Japan and three of the Nordic countries such as Finland, Norway and 
Sweden in the early 1990s), was a good example of Japan’s middle power diplomacy. 
The timing of the crisis was important because American hegemony and its capacity 
to address the financial crisis were considerably impeded. Asian countries looked to 
the United States for exhibiting leadership, but the United States failed to show a firm 
will to assist Asian nations, as I will discuss below by showing the lack of US 
leadership (Table 6). This prompted Japan to take positive action, although Japan too 
had been in deep recession since the early 1990s. A series of proposals, under the 
general theme of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was an example of Japanese 
middle power initiatives. At first, Japan took the lead in those discussions among 
Asian counties as soon as the economic crisis hit Thailand, and later worked with the 
United States after the original AMF plan was turned down in order to stabilize the 
seriously damaged regional economy. In sum, the Japanese response toward the 
critical moment was divided into two phases. The key player was the United States 
and it was essential for Japan to handle relations with America to achieve what Japan 
                                                  
8 Lake, David. "Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures". International 
Studies Quarterly, 1984 
9 Kindleberger, Charles. Aliber, Robert. “Manias, Panics and Crashes –A History of Financial Crises- Sixth 
Edition”. Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. 
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wanted, as I will discuss later.  
The most significant existing literature on middle powers is a study of 
Australia by Higgott and Cooper. Higgott and Cooper defined Australia as a middle 
power by discussing its role in 1990 during the first half of Uruguay Round (UR). 
They highlighted its initiative to organize the Cairns Group (CG) by inviting 
agricultural producers all over the world, setting the agenda the group had to stick to, 
and maintaining a devoted attitude while its partner Canada defected from the 
leadership role. As it sounded like the CG was doing well against the United States 
and Europe, the two authors appreciated the value of the group’s function in the 
international negotiation at the time when they published their thesis.  
 However in reality, during the course of UR negotiations, Australia shifted 
its position from a middle power, as the balancer between the diverse positions taken 
by the United States and European Community, to a position that was much more 
supportive of the United States. Consequently, it lost credibility with the EC and, if 
anything, the case study showed Australian failure in following through on its middle 
power role. My preliminary findings are that Japan was therefore more successful as a 
middle power during the Asian financial crisis than Australian was during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.  
By contrast Japan during the Asian financial crisis began with a unilateral 
policy initiative but quickly embraced a ‘middle’ balancer position that allowed it to 
establish new frameworks to deal with any recurrence of crises in future. This is a 
much more constructive example of middle power and my thesis will make an 
important contribution to the literature. Even though the early work by Higgott and 
Cooper spearheaded the middle power theory, it was unfinished because the thesis 
was released in 1990 without covering the second half of the negotiation through 
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1994. In this regard, the 1990s Japanese case can offer us a more robust version of 
middle power diplomacy including the aftermath of the AFC. This is the advantage of 
my argument and contribution to the literature in order to discuss the whole context 
relating to the AFC and AMF plan. 
The role of middle powers has rarely been covered in the discussion of 
international political economy and there are few case studies about the concept. For 
example, the hegemonic stability theory does not identify the middle power. Although 
Lake added concepts such as supporters, spoilers, and free riders, he did not discuss 
the role of middle powers. As he categorized those factors on the premise that the 
United States as a sole power in the Western bloc during the Cold War led the rest, it 
cannot be applied easily to the post-Cold War era. In addition, the meaning of “middle 
power” is not necessarily definite. It is difficult to identify what the middle power is 
among some elements; military power, economic power, political influence, size of 
population and most importantly diplomatic achievement as a coordinator of coalition. 
In my argument, I pay attention to limited conditions of Japan which is economically 
strong but militarily constrained. As Japan’s influence is militarily limited, Japan is 
not able to be a great power from realist’s perspective. Hence, it is possible for me to 
describe Japan as a middle power. In any case, the study of middle power diplomacy 
is still at an incipient stage. 
The only serious application of middle power theory for economic diplomacy 
is the case study of the Uruguay Round by Higgott and Cooper, as I have already 
mentioned above. Although they recount each process of the Cairns Group from 
coalition building to management of the group observing Australia as a mediator, 
there are few specific examinations and actual cases for discussing middle power 
theory. It was not until Japan in the late 1990s that a similar example emerged. With 
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the concept of middle power, it is, accordingly, possible to analyze the rare concept 
such as the AMF plan as well as the Cairns Group.  
A middle power is expected to drive a balance between two alternative 
perspectives and be a neutral arbiter helping to arrive at a compromise position. Japan 
deviated from the middle power role by proposing the establishment of an AMF, as an 
alternative to the IMF, without prior consultation with the United States. Although an 
original AMF would have been welcomed by most Asian countries, the United States 
favored only the IMF as an arbiter of crisis management. In the first phase 
immediately after the crisis surfaced, Japan appeared to have acted more like a spoiler 
for the United States, even though the idea of the AMF was widely welcomed in the 
region. American rejection quickly reminded Japan that it was in no position to 
overlook American interests and that it had to try and balance two competing interests 
if it was to play a constructive role in the crisis. In this second phase of Japanese 
diplomacy, we see newer initiatives are successfully implemented that achieve a 
balance between protecting the role of the IMF as the crisis manager and assisting 
regional countries in dealing with the aftermath of the crisis. It is in this second phase 
that we see Japan emerge as a regional middle power.  
The post-Cold War era is an age of economical multi-polarization. While 
many developing nations, especially in Asia, became wealthier, the economic 
dominance of the United States was in decline. Despite this decline, the United States 
remains the most powerful nation in the world both economically and militarily. 
However, it was the time to redefine diplomacy away from the assumption of 
bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union along with the end of the 
Cold War. Although Beeson describes the situation during the Cold War as, “the 
shattering of an old order which had seen most of the world locked into a bipolar 
14 
 
system that left little room for maneuver, let alone the sort of creativity,”10 the 
post-Cold War era was a new age to incorporate the ex-Eastern bloc into the world 
economic order. The United States and international organizations such as the IMF 
redefined their roles and began supporting new friends like Russia, but economic 
reform in Russia was up and down. One thing was certain; there were too many things 
for the United States to deal with to actively engage the Asian crisis because the 
United States did not donate any funds at all to save Thailand falling into inescapable 
plight. As Krasner noted about the lack of leadership by the United States, Asian 
nations in crisis thought from the case of Thailand that America “will adopt a more 
narrowly self-interested policy. It will be less concerned about upholding international 
economic rules that are not optimal for itself.”11  
It is true that the United States as a hegemonic power looked quite passive to 
rescue Thailand soon after the crisis broke out. Although Webb and Krasner point out 
that “the real test of hegemonic leadership arises in times of crises,”12 the United 
States neglected to make perplexed Asian nations feel at ease. Gilpin states that “the 
president (Clinton) dismissed the crisis as “a few small glitches in the road.” This 
abandonment by the Clinton Administration caused the Thai government, a close 
friend of the United States, to feel deep resentment.”13 What is worse, IMF measure 
after the joint relief fund as well as the US reluctance to share the burden to save 
Thailand was regarded as a wrong policy. Ciorciari says that “Thai authorities held 
the U.S. government largely responsible for the perceived flaws of the IMF. In 
particular, they resented the pace of financial disbursement and requirements to 
                                                  
10 Beeson, Mark. “Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy”. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 65, No. 5, November 2011 
11 Krasner, Stephen. “International Theory- Positivism and Beyond”, “Chapter five, the accomplishment of 
international political economy”. Cambridge University Press. 1996.   
12 Webb, Michael. Krasner, Stephen. “Hegemonic stability theory: an empirical assessment”. Review of 
international Studies. 1989. 
13 Gilpin, Robert. “The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century”. Princeton 
University Pres. 2000. 
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liberalize the Thai economy.”14 The United States as a hegemon did not show its firm 
will again to contain the crisis quickly by leading other regional partners as in the age 
of the Great Depression. In this regard, the Clinton administration did not seem to 
learn a lesson from Kindleberger who formulated the hegemonic stability theory 
explaining that “the 1929 Depression was so wide, so deep, and so long because no 
leading country was able and willing to discharge the role of a stabilizer.”15 The US 
unwillingness to intervene into the Asian Crisis was the similar to the response during 
the financial tragedy in 1920s. Therefore, it was a unique time that Japan as rising 
power and the United States with the temporary lack of motivation intersected at the 
very tense situation.  
Australia was an early example of middle power but the Cairns Group itself 
was not a neutral mediator between European and the American interests. Australia 
tried to lead the group to benefit from the deal with the two giants, yet in consequence 
the Cairns Group got closer to a more tolerant America and kept away from die-hard 
Europe because the European Community was too obstinate to make decisive 
compromises in agricultural issues. Still, the case of Australia during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations provides us with a meaningful example, which should nonetheless 
be evaluated separately from Japan’s case during the Asian Financial Crisis. Overall, I 
conclude that Japan managed to play the role of middle power by altering its strategy 
while Australia finally relinquished the role. 
In order to demonstrate that Japan is a middle power country, I will delve 
into its response to the Asian Financial Crisis, which broke out in the summer of 
1997 in Thailand. Although Japan gained support from Asian members in the 
discussion for creating an AMF due to the fact that those states such as Thailand, 
                                                  
14 Ciorciari, John. “The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers Since 1975”. Georgetown 
University Press. 2010. 
15 Kindleberger, Charles. “Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation”. International Organization 40, 4, Autumn 1986. 
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South Korea and Indonesia were concerned parties in the crisis, Japan was forced to 
withdraw the idea because it was not supported by the United States, while China 
and South Korea also opposed it. Therefore, the fact that the early stage of the 
movement for establishing the AMF was generally regarded as a failure of Japanese 
diplomacy is most convincing in Japanese academic society, as a well-known 
Japanese historian Iokibe indicates.16 In fact, Mr. Sakakibara, one of the key persons 
in Japan in those days admitted that, “it was impetuous to proceed and fatal blow not 
to secure enough prior consultation with the US and China.”17 However, if we look 
attentively at the subsequent process, we come to understand that the failure of the 
AMF to get the US approval was not diplomatic defeat but a tactical retreat for Japan 
to redefine itself as the middle power. 
 Japan learned a lesson not to undermine US hegemony when the AMF 
package was turned down. As Lipscy explained, “debates over the AMF proposal 
have revolved around distributive political issues rather than the quintessential 
question of economic efficiency.”18 Therefore, Japan paid cautious attention to how 
the United States responded thereafter to its actions and accordingly conducted prior 
consultation with Washington. In a series of agreements, mutual surveillance, 
bail-outs and currency swap systems were realized. As adequate coordination with the 
United States was made, Japan did not elicit any strong reaction again during these 
processes. In addition, as Miyashita points out, Japan “sought no institutionalization 
of Asian Monetary Fund. The United States quickly supported the new proposal.”19 
                                                  
16 Makoto, Iokibe. “Sengo Nihon Gaikoshi (Japanese diplomacy in the post war period)”. YuhikakuAruma, third 
edition. 2014. 
17 Sakakibara, Eisuke. “Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta hi (The Day that Rocked Japan and the World)”. Tokyo: Chuo 
KoronShinsha, 2000 
18 Lipscy, Phillip "Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal" Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs Volume 3, 
Number 1, spring 2003 
19 Miyashita, Akitoshi. “Foreign Policy in Comparative on Perspective, Domestic and International Influences on 
State Behavior –Chapter 7, Japanese Foreign Policy: The International- Domestic Nexus-”. Congressional 
Quarterly Inc. 2002. 
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As a consequence, the aim to protect Asian financial order through an AMF was 
gradually achieved, as Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson said that the “AMF was 
rejected by the IMF, the US, and China, only to be resurrected in various stages and 
different guises as the Manila Framework, New Miyazawa Initiative, and then the 
Chiang Mai initiative.”20  
 In order to think about the role of middle power theory, however, one 
question remains from the previous paragraph. Must a middle power always give in to 
the superpower? Cannot it develop an independent diplomacy from the hegemon? My 
answer is basically “Yes”, but it is not surrender and more like a partnership. First, a 
middle power country is not a great country but a state with limited power. It is not 
equal to stronger nations regarding national strength or nature of power such as in the 
legal restraint of the Japanese constitution. Second, a middle power aims at 
coordinating interests among members of a coalition and has the hegemon accept their 
requests. To be more precise, confrontation against the superpower is not the 
diplomatic way to be taken to realize their interests but concerting with the strongest 
is needed. As the United States as a hegemon is the most important nation for almost 
any country economically and militarily which is with few exceptions for members of 
the Cairns Group and Asian nations regarding the AMF plan, these members also 
wanted the middle power to maintain cooperative relations with the United States. As 
many of them looked upon the hegemon as a military ally, they did not seek disputes 
with America despite the fact that GATT and the AMF were obviously the way to ask 
America to compromise economically for them. In fact, Australia drove the Cairns 
Group into cooperation with the United States, even though Japan originally ignored 
the mechanism. 
                                                  
20 Hook, Glenn. Gilson, Julie. Hughes, Christopher. Dobson, Hugo. "Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis: 
Patterns, Motivation and Instrumentalisation of Japanese Regional Economic Diplomacy" European Journal of 
East Asian Studies, Vol.1 No.2  2002 
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The concept of middle power is helpful to explain my argument, but I have to 
admit that the theory is not necessarily common outside of the academic community. 
Soeya recounts that it was quite a laborious work to enhance understanding about 
Japanese diplomacy as the middle power when he developed his argument. While 
pacifists in Japan were cautious about the more active role of Japan, which reminds 
people of Imperial Japan during the Second World War, traditional nationalists 
including an influential member of Japanese parliament were not convinced because 
they believed that Japan was a major power commensurate with the United States and 
China.21  Therefore I deal with this cumbersome idea carefully by applying it to the 
case study. 
This thesis is divided into five parts. Chapter 2 will introduce the 
international political economy in the post Second War era, that is, the path to the 
financial crisis and its aftermath. Then, it will deal with the positioning of the middle 
power in the discourse of International Political Economy (IPE) by explaining how it 
works to solve the problem. In Chapter 3, I will describe how Australia responded as 
the leader of the Cairns Group during GATT Uruguay Round by applying the role of 
the middle power country. 
In chapter 4, I will address the issue that Japan played the role of the middle 
power nation in the case study. As it was successful in spite of the difficult process, I 
will examine closely the process to prove that Japan is the middle power country.  
At the end of the thesis, I will conclude with a brief summary in Chapter 5. In 
my thesis, I would like more to explore how Japan rearranged these plans after the 
original AMF plan was refused. 
 
 
                                                  
21 Soeya, Yoshihide. “Nihon no middle power gaiko [Japan's middle power diplomacy]". Chikumashinsyo. 2005. 
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Chapter 2: Positioning of middle power in IPE 
The question in this chapter is how the middle power should be categorized 
in the two case studies of Australia during Uruguay Round and Japan during the 
Asian financial crisis, in each of which there were certain elements of middle power 
diplomacy. Therefore, in this chapter I will define the concept in the context of 
international political economy. 
The middle power concept is not is not well developed but has been used in 
analyzing Australia’s role in establishing the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round 
of GATT negotiations, which started in 1986 and concluded in 1994. Middle powers 
play an issue-specific role in areas of particular interest and are not to be confused as 
regional powers. In addition, a middle power, according to Higgott and Cooper, is 
willing to coordinate various interests and procedures for “restraining and modifying 
the behavior of larger, more powerful actors through the strengthening of order in the 
world economy.” 22  In the Uruguay Round, Australia together with Canada 
coordinated the interests of agriculture producing and exporting countries to push for 
free trade and inject itself as a third force, possibly mediating conflicts between the 
United States and EU. As for Japanese case, it is the second case following the 
Australian case defining the Japanese response in the late 1990s during the Asian 
Financial Crisis as the middle power.  
Unlike the theory of middle power, there are other state categories that have 
been better theorized, for example by Kindleberger and David Lake. Kindleberger as 
an authority of economic history first put forward hegemonic stability theory (HST) 
and then Lake developed categories of states in HST that includes hegemons, 
supporters, challengers and free riders. According to Lake, Japan and West Germany 
                                                  
22 Higgott, Richard. Cooper, Andrew. "Middle Power leadership and coalition building: Australia, and Cairns 
Group, and the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations" International Organization 44, 4, Autumn 1990. 
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might be classified as “supporter” nations whereas the United States was 
positioned as “hegemonic leader” in the international political economy. Lake states 
that “when a hegemonic leader exists within the international economy, supporters 
will free-ride, protecting industry at home and expanding exports abroad.”23 Japan 
was exempt from assuming the burden for the world economy as a whole. In fact, 
Japan could not afford to share equal burden with the United States in the years 
immediately after the Second World War. Japan struggled to stabilize its domestic 
society to the best of its ability, and suffered heavily from the lack of food. It barely 
managed to rule the country as a state in the late 1940s under the US occupation. 
Therefore, the United States was intentionally willing to accept cheap Japanese 
products and tolerantly encouraged Japan to develop its export-led economy. The 
United States also needed Japan to be a tractable ally and a successful state in the 
Western bloc as a front line against the communist China and the Soviet Union. This 
generous and strategic assistance was a match in Asia for the European Recovery 
Program (ERP), the so-called Marshall Plan. Although the bilateral relationship over 
the Pacific Ocean based on the post-war strategy faced a lot of trade frictions 
regarding textiles, steel and color television during 1960s to 1980s, the economic 
privilege was a major driving force to achieve the miraculously swift growth of the 
Japanese economy in the post-war era predicated on American hegemony.   
The middle power is neither a hegemonic leader nor a free rider, but another 
significant actor that is able to contribute to order in the global political economy. A 
middle power clearly has strong interests in maintaining system stability and with 
sufficient economic, diplomatic, or political resources to find resolution to systemic 
problems. These characteristics apply to Japan because it has been an important 
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beneficiary of the post war economic system established by the United States and is a 
global economic power with strong potential to contribute to regional stability. Japan 
has been deeply engaged in the regional economies through trade and investment, 
especially since the 1985 Plaza Accord that led to a sharply revalued Yen. According 
to Hisane, “The sharply higher yen prompted Japanese manufacturers to rush to shift 
production abroad, especially to Southeast Asia, to take advantage of cheaper labor 
there.”24 Hence the maintenance of system stability is critical for Japanese economic 
growth and prosperity.   
In order to maintain the steadiness of the international economic structure, a 
middle power nation can contribute to complicated issues that interest regional states 
or relations between regional states and the hegemon. As Hundt describes, “middle 
powers can act as catalysts of new initiatives, facilitators of coalitions in support of 
existing initiatives and agenda-setting, and as managers of extant institutions.”25 As I 
argue, Australia and Japan fulfilled these expectations as leaders of the Cairns Group 
and in dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis, respectively.  
The concept of middle power is helpful in discussing examples such as the 
Cairns Group mainly initiated by Australia and the AMF initiative by Japan. If Lake’s 
classification is applied, these two cases could be both supporters, toward hegemonic 
leaders by forces that try, to a certain extent, to assume more of a role than other 
countries. Although Maswood notes that “the role of the supporter is to take on an 
additional burden of cost sharing”26, he does not say that a supporter means to replace 
a hegemon with itself. Lake’s definition for supporters says that “nor- unlike a 
hegemonic leader- are they willing to accept high short-term costs for long-term 
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gains”. Therefore, the concept of supporter is an actor that works with a hegemon and 
is willing to play a big role but does not have a long-term strategy. Although a middle 
power also collaborates with a hegemon, it is more independent than a supporter and 
leads a group of collective interests; freer trade on agriculture for the Australian case 
and economic stability in Asia for the Japanese case, to coordinate interests among 
some members. Hence it is possible to argue that Australia and Japan attempted to go 
beyond the above limit of a supporter. 
The two nations were eager to do more by mediating interests between their 
members - 14 nations in the CG and some of the Asian countries which supported the 
AMF plan, but did not seem to desire to take responsibility for undertaking all the 
burdens as hegemons. Whether or not the two middle powers aimed to replace the 
United States as a hegemonic power, America was overall superior to them in many 
respects, which necessarily positioned the United States in a role of hegemonic nation 
essentially over the all related parties in the Cairns Group and AMF plan. 
The middle power as a terminology in international relations theory has not 
become a major political idea yet and is not necessarily unified among scholars and 
policy makers who apply it to analyze the international relations. Realists do not 
mention the concept nor do liberalists, so it is not clear what it is and how it is 
positioned in IR discourse. It is not yet a prevailing term as it is a relatively new 
concept. As Carr says that “the middle-power role is not a fixed universal but 
something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of 
the international system.”27 The role of middle power is not commonly shared and is 
likely to change, depending on the development of international affairs. Until the final 
stage of the Cold War, no one paid much attention to the role of middle powers in the 
                                                  
27 Carr, Andrew. "Is Australia a middle power? Systemic impact approach". Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, Volume 68, No. 1, 2014 
23 
 
showdown between the two super powers. As for the international economy, since the 
United States still overwhelmed the rest of the world, not every country had to or 
could mediate interests with the hegemon.  
Although it is not necessarily evident, “the decline of America” has been 
discussed over and over again. Huntington wrote that people were preoccupied with 
this talk in late 1980s and said that America did appear ill socially, economically and 
politically and could not offer a successful model to the world.28 In fact, even now 
any story of American hegemonic decline obsesses scholars and policy makers in the 
world as “the End of Pax Americana” is discussed in the latest version of Foreign 
Affairs magazine.29 For instance, Lake demonstrates that “America's decline has 
gained new prominence in the current political debate. There is little doubt that the 
country's economic competitiveness has, in fact, waned since its hegemonic zenith in 
the 1950s.”30 Any event which plagues the United States such as the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis and endless chaos in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria seems to indicate 
that America is no longer willing to tackle problems and is perhaps incapable of 
solving them. However, Strange plainly rejects the periodically repeated argument 
that the US hegemony is gradually declining, calling it “the persistent myth of lost 
hegemony.”31 Judging from history, the United Kingdom became so rapidly wealthy 
from the Industrial Revolution since the middle of the 18th century that Britain was 
able to lead the world in a period of Pax Britannica in the 19th century and the early 
20th century. In this sense, US hegemony has lasted for just less than 100 years, which 
is half of the period of Britain supremacy.   
                                                  
28 Huntington, Samuel. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”.  
University of Oklahoma Press1991. 
29 Simon, Steven and Stevenson, Jonathan. "The End of Pax Americana Why Washington’s Middle East Pullback 
Makes Sense". Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015 Issue. 
30 Lake,David. “International political economy : perspectives on global power and wealth (4th edtion)”. 
Bedford/St. Martin's, c2000. 
31 Strange, Susan. “The persistent myth of lost hegemony”. International Organization 41, 4, Autumn 1987.  
24 
 
A middle power is an actor with great interest to stabilize the international 
order but it is not strong enough to lead the whole world. Hence a middle power is 
required to work together with the hegemon as a matter of course. As Strange 
indicates, “collective action is still possible but only when the United States takes the 
lead when, in short, it still chooses to act as a leader.”32 This was the exact mistake 
Japan made when it proposed an AMF plan without prior approval by the United 
States. Japan seemed more confident to regain the Asian economy by only its 
initiative than its actual position in those days. Japan needed to learn, according to 
Cox, that “middle power may play a supporting role in such a hegemonic order.”33 In 
fact, scholars Beeson and Higgott also emphasize the importance of the role of the 
hegemon by saying “for all the potential that middle powers may possess in theory, in 
practice without the agreement and participation of the ‘great’ powers, substantive 
and effective international cooperation and policy innovation- difficult at the best of 
times- is all but impossible.”34 
 In this thesis, I argue that Japan is a middle power country or played a role as 
a middle power by all accounts above. Japan is not a great power regardless of its 
national strength. In fact, the rising sun is the world’s third largest economy and 
without any objection much of its budget is allocated to military expenditures. 
However, as the country is militarily restricted by its constitution, it cannot deter 
potentially hostile actors with implied threats of military invasion. According to Bull, 
in order to act the part of a great power, usable military power is prerequisite. Political 
influence cannot be exercised without hard power capabilities in the international 
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community.35 Japan has kept the constitution intact since it was put in force in 1947. 
Although it was originally aimed at constraining a militarized Japan by the occupation 
authority, mainly the United States, America itself was irritated with Japan as a 
non-cooperative ally. The post-war constitution was prevented from revision even 
through changing times such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War and 
its end. Therefore, successive leaders and diplomatic authorities were required to 
develop foreign relations within the limitation. Japan, instead fixed its diplomatic 
direction on economic development, which has taken hold of Japanese diplomacy in 
the post-war era. Consequently, the role of middle power is the course of nature for 
such a constrained nation to pursue its diplomatic principle.   
 As I described a role of middle power, a middle power country can play an 
important part in international affairs. It is not an actor getting into the limelight but a 
coordinator leading followers, which need persistent devotion to maintain coalition 
and to keep cooperation with the hegemonic leader. In the next two chapters, I will 
argue how the middle power functions by applying the two cases; Australia and Japan.  
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Chapter3: Australian role for the Cairns Group during the GATT 
Uruguay Round 
Since the GATT regime was founded after the Second World War, many 
nations benefited from free trade in which its primary norms such as 
non-discrimination were well respected until early 1970s. The GATT regime 
functioned quite well based on reciprocity, liberalization, and nondiscrimination 
under American hegemony, which had swiftly expanded the scale of world trade. At 
the same time, the number of GATT members also dramatically increased from 26 in 
the Dillon Round in 1960-1961 to 123 in the Uruguay Round in 1986-1994. However, 
a lot of complaints were stewing in some small and medium sized countries where 
agriculture was their primary industry. As they were not big enough to compete 
respectively with great powers, “nominal” free trade made them felt unfair under the 
GATT regime. This was the environmental factor which induced Australia to lead 
like-minded nations to work together by organizing the Cairns Group. The discontent 
was exactly what Australia shared. In this chapter, I will argue how Australia initiated 
collective bargaining during the GATT Uruguay Round. 
As Modelski explains in his theory of the long cycle that the hegemon tends 
to take the lead in “the formation of economic organizations of global scope.”36 
While the International Trade Organization (ITO) was not approved by the United 
States in the late 1940s, on the other hand the GATT was perceived as a good 
diplomatic tool to maximize its economic interests. For example, the United States 
volunteered to open its own domestic market to devastated allies such as Japan and 
the West Germany because the US administration understood that the economic 
growth of other nations in the Western bloc would make a great contribution toward 
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its own economic interests and strategic outlook against the Eastern bloc. As Keohane 
points out, “awareness of its hegemony was therefore the foundation on which 
American generosity rested.”37 In this sense, the United States positioned itself very 
clearly as the leader of the free world. In addition, it was attentive to the details of 
what allies wanted as well and generously willing to compromise with them.  
However, Gilpin states that “no nation has yet chosen to pursue either an 
exclusively free trade or an exclusively nationalistic policy. A nation’s mix of these 
two policies is a function of its domestic economy and of conditions prevailing in the 
world economy.”38 While it was generous of the United States to tolerate free-riders, 
those countries such as Japan and South Korea as the front line in the Cold War 
against communism hosted American military bases and barely managed to placate 
anti-American and capitalism sentiments in their countries. In this context, the 
economic relationship between Japan and the United States was often tense; the richer 
Japan became the more trade conflicts broke out between the both countries. 
Regarding European Community, Tanner says that, after Europe changed its status 
“from being a net importer to being a net exporter of agricultural products in the mid 
1970s,”39 trade disputes arose with increasing frequency between Europe and other 
countries because it took advantage of protective policy. The change of power balance, 
especially the ostensible decline of the United States through the quagmire of the 
Vietnam War and Nixon Shock, which ended the post-war Bretton Woods system in 
1971, woke up Europe to speak out in the world Market. 
Consequently, the emergence of European Community (EC) as an exporter 
marginalized Australia because the EC was also an agricultural giant. In 1980s, the 
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EC was in the process of market integration and economic unification in Europe 
appeared to Australia as the construction of a trade fortress. Kawahara explains that 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the EC to promote its agricultural exports 
helped spread protectionism across the world.40 The CAP was originally set for 
intra-Europe steady development and rescue of those who worked in its agricultural 
industry. In effect, the European Commission elucidates why the policy was made:  
 
The CAP has its roots in 1950s Western Europe, whose societies had been 
damaged by years of war, and where agriculture had been crippled and food 
supplies could not be guaranteed. The CAP aimed at encouraging better 
productivity in the food chain, ensuring fair standard of living to the agricultural 
community, market stabilization and ensuring the availability of food supplies to 
EU consumers at reasonable price.41 
 
However, various complaints from other countries revealed that the CAP was 
a highly protectionist mechanism holding on to the vested interests. Even though the 
EC made an epoch-making decision to reluctantly accept the agenda of agriculture for 
discussion in the Uruguay Round, the group kept showing a passive negotiating 
attitude all along with no intention of abandoning the CAP, which irritated the United 
States and the Cairns Group.  
Although each nation in Europe was not necessarily singularly strong in 
agriculture, the European Community as a whole of small and medium sized states 
trumped Australia in all. There were, in those days, pessimistic viewpoints rampant in 
                                                  
40 Kawahara, Masami. “Uruguay Round and Australia〔Uruguay Round to Australia〕” Australian Study Vol. 6. 
1995. 
41 European Commission. “Agriculture and Rural Development”, accessed on September 27th 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/early-years/index_en.htm  
29 
 
Australia for its future economic outlook owing to its marginalization in the world 
economy. For example, former Treasurer and then Prime Minister of Australia 
Keating stated that Australia was no longer a “Lucky Country”, an affectionate term 
which originally came from the title of a book published in 1964 describing the good 
old days of Australia.42 Rather, Keating argued, Australia was on its way to becoming 
a banana republic as a ruined nation. Hence, the down-and-out needed to shift the 
current trend to achieve a breakthrough in the deadlock.  
Equitable free trade was the only means for Australia to boost its economy. 
As the former Prime Minister Hawke recognized the GATT as “the old-fashioned 
FTAs based on a 40-year-old GATT Article which sanctions discrimination,”43 he 
was very suspicious and frustrated with the status quo until the Tokyo round from 
1973 to 1979. Hence, he placed great importance on the principle of free trade. 
Australia tried to observe the rule as much as possible and provided legitimacy by 
positioning itself as the Fair Trader in Agriculture. However, at the same time, the 
Hawke administration was not utopian and because of the huge gap of economic 
power, knew that it was not likely to influence decision making processes occupied by 
the big two as long as Australia individually tried to urge them. Higgott highlights the 
limits of bargaining power by weaker states by saying “smaller players on the other 
hand, invariably do not have the luxury of choice that would allow them to adopt 
defensive strategies. Smaller states are unable to avoid the impact of many of the 
changes that take place in the international political economy. Similarly, they are in no 
position to alter these changes single-handed”.44 Australian leaders recognized that 
the country was no longer a rich continent at the time of 1980s. Nor did it have a 
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political influence to compete with the big two; The United States and the European 
Community. However, Australia still influenced many small states dependent on 
agricultural trade all over the world and had the know-how in terms of smoother, 
more functional and experienced bureaucratic system. This realistic perception and 
self-diagnosis encouraged Australia in a constructive manner to form the Cairns 
Group with other agricultural countries.  
In order to discuss the role of middle powers specifically, Higgott and 
Cooper offer us a good example to analyze the role of Australia as the middle power 
by running the Cairns Group in the GATT Uruguay Round. It was established in 1986 
and contained diverse nations from Asia-Pacific, South America, and even from East 
Europe in order to appeal collectively to the fairness of trade in agricultural products, 
which was monopolized by the United States and Europe. As each member was 
politically weaker and economically smaller in agriculture than the two agricultural 
giants, Australia tried to turn their power into a combined bargaining group to 
compete fairly with the world agricultural hegemony. In this regard, Higgott and 
Cooper indicated that “the formation of the Cairns Group was designed to overcome 
this disadvantage.”45 The strategy of the Cairns Group to gather collective power 
against great powers is not a new idea but historically common. For example, the 
integration of Europe was originally designed to prevent regional members from 
waging war against each other. However, it was also intended for Europe as a whole 
to participate in the global power game, competing with the United States, the Soviet 
Union and China. It was more or less impossible for most countries to reflect their 
own interests in international negotiations unless they formed an alliance to rival 
stronger nations equally.   
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 Equally important, this was a joint project for developed and developing 
countries to work together for gaining common benefits from free trade in agriculture, 
which encouraged developing nations such as Indonesia and Brazil to join the GATT 
Uruguay round. In this sense, it was epoch-making in the history of international 
political economy. 
 
Table 2 
The original members of the Cairns Group 
No. Participating countries GDP per capita (current US$)  in 1986 Region 
1 Australia 11364.0  Oceania 
2 New Zealand  9427.6  Oceania 
3 Fiji 1795.7  Oceania 
4 Canada 14335.7  North America 
5 Thailand 813.1  South East Asia 
6 Philippines 535.2  South East Asia 
7 Malaysia 1741.1  South East Asia 
8 Indonesia 483.0  South East Asia 
9 Argentina 3602.2  South America 
10 Colombia 1137.5  South America 
11 Brazil 1928.7  South America 
12 Uruguay 1940.0  South America 
13 Chile 1437.2  South America 
14 Hungary No data East Europe 
Source: The World Bank 
  
 
Australia was consistent in the role of middle power by leading the members 
of the Cairns Group and trying to obtain conditions more favorable to the group’s 
members. Among 14 diverse members, Australia knew what others expected and was 
actually willing to exercise leadership in the international limelight. Historically 
speaking, Australia showed strong inclination to get into power games and tried to 
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take the lead in the international politics in the turmoil of post-war era when Evatt, 
Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1941- 1949, steered its diplomacy. 
According to Capling, “Australia’s participation in this trilateral process represented 
another aspect of its Cairns Group leadership: intermediary leadership, or the 
willingness to try to mediate a resolution to the burgeoning conflict between the great 
powers. This was a coup for Australian diplomacy and for the Cairns Group: it was 
unprecedented for the two economic superpowers to invite a third and much smaller 
power to the table in a multilateral trade negotiation and it confirmed the Cairns 
Group’s role as the “third force” in the agriculture negotiations.”46 This was the 
inevitable role as the middle power to bundle up numerous countries that did not have 
the same level of economic power. It was not easy for Australia to mediate various 
interests among the 14 members, but the lucky country did not depart from the focus 
on one specific topic which was agriculture. Higgott and Cooper highlight that 
“Australia was able to preserve the single-issue orientation of the coalition by 
defusing Brazilian pressures to broaden the Group’s agenda.”47 The group might 
have collapsed once the sole topic connecting 14 members was put aside because they 
were very different from each other except for agriculture. While the world political 
structure dramatically transformed around 1990 from the end of the Cold War and the 
break-down of the Eastern bloc, the Uruguay Round continued until 1994 for a total 
of 8 years, which went through the historic transformation and its subsequent 
uncertainty. As a result, Australia managed to run the third force of an agricultural 
bloc toward the two hegemonic leaders, the United States and Europe, by “restraining 
and modifying the behavior of larger, more powerful actors,”48 mentioned by the two 
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authors. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Department of Trade, Annual Report 1986-87 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1987) 
One of the key reasons why Australia kept the members unified through the 
negotiation was the persistent effort for the cause. The country was involved in the 
movement calling for fairness in the international economic system for a long time. 
Consequently, it gained a good reputation and confidence from developing economies, 
which helped the country to initiate the CG. The two scholars argue that “Australia’s 
long-standing sympathy for the position of raw material exporting nations was 
exemplified by the country’s repeated attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to introduce 
more equity into the international political economy.”49 The hard and steady 
approach from Canberra finally came into bloom when Australia called on other 
members to form the group based on mutual trust. On the other hand, the stance of 
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another leader, Canada was not fixed as a coordinator. Canada is often regarded as 
middle power country in the debate of international relations similar to Australia. 
Nevertheless, the North American country failed to lead because it also shared various 
stakes with the United States as a member of North American traders. As Canada was 
the biggest economy among the members, it was supposed to take on its leadership 
more straightforwardly but it looked more an opportunist between America and the 
other members. The double-tongued diplomacy and unwillingness to lead the CG 
revealed that Canada would not be a natural actor. Therefore, the group members 
gradually lost confidence in Canada and inversely put more trust on Australia with the 
passage of time. As Tyers pointed out during the UR negotiations, “the leadership of 
the Cairns Group has fallen predominantly to Australia.”50 In order to play a role of a 
middle power country, Australia was more fitting because the lucky country as a 
coordinator had never waived collective interests belonging to the Cairns Group. 
The role of a middle power country is to mediate various interests among the 
group members and also with the hegemon. In this respect, Higgott and Cooper 
describe the Australian role very closely during the GATT negotiation as I indicated 
above. As a matter of fact, the group as a third force succeeded in drawing massive 
attention to small and medium sized countries and gaining compromise from the 
United States. The middle power policy Australia pursued during the Uruguay Round 
created actual benefits that proved that the CG was not a group of utopian dreamers 
for ideal cooperation between the North and the South, but a voluntary working force 
from a pragmatic viewpoint. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating accepted the 
conclusion of GATT UR negotiation and praised its result by providing concrete 
numbers: 
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…a 21 per cent reduction in subsidized export volumes, an outcome that 
will be particularly significant in relation to Europe and the United States, 
our principal competitors in world agricultural markets limits on the extent 
to which governments can artificially support inefficient domestic 
industries cuts in trade barriers and improved market access for a wide 
range of commodities of particular significance to Australia ( including rice. 
beef, dairy), and a much more predictable and transparent trading 
environment through the conversion of non-tariff measures to tariffs, 
together with commitments to reduce tariffs substantially.51  
 
In addition, the GATT secretariat complimented Australia officially on its 
performance in general and its role of coordinator in the Cairns Group: 
 
Australia's role in the international trading system. Members recognized 
Australia's strong support for the multilateral trading system, based on 
the GATT. Most of Australia's external trade was MFN (Most Favored 
Nation) -based and, apart from two exceptions in the meat sector, not 
subject to any bilateral restraints. Australia had worked vigorously for the 
successful outcome of the Uruguay Round. Several members highlighted 
Australia's perseverance as the coordinator of the Cairns Group.52 
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Although it is true that the United States and the EC were too strong for the CG to 
break the vested interests, there is no doubt that the CG played a certain role to rectify 
the unfairness. It was indisputable that faint but desperate voices from tiny nations 
were reflected against the international cartel of the two agricultural giants. If it had 
not been for the Cairns Group, the tightly closed society would have remained 
monopolized by the United States and the EC and the two owners would have enjoyed 
the cozy board meeting exclusively. In this sense, the CG was successful at least to 
drive in a wedge between the big two. It was also a remarkable result to prove that 
small nations in the group had obtained a way to reflect their voice and interests in the 
negotiations and exercise some political leverage on the decision making. It was not 
an easy path because the redefinition of Australian diplomatic policy entailed the 
change of national identity from Europe-oriented country to a member of Asia-Pacific. 
However, in order to get the CG success in the negotiation, Australia made itself 
intentionally cut back internal regulation and protection for agricultural products, 
which bestowed legitimacy to lead the group to a certain extent. Hence, Okamoto 
enumerates the role of Australia during the UR as a successful case for its middle 
power diplomacy.53  
 On the other hand, there is another perspective to suspect whether Australia 
managed to run the CG as a middle power country. In the beginning of the UR, the 
group was supposed to mediate interests as a third force between the United States 
and Europe, but what actually happened was for the CG to choose the United States as 
a partner while separating itself from Europe. In order to achieve freer world trade, 
the CG shared interests with the United States. For example, the CG and the United 
States advocated winding back export subsidies on agriculture exports, whereas the 
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EC insisted on maintaining the assistance. However, as Maswood points out, “by 
throwing its weight behind the US, the CG lost credibility with the EU and was 
unable to fulfill a potentially useful role in mediating the gulf between the US and the 
EU.”54 While America was pliable as the Regan administration espoused free trade to 
a certain extent, Europe was too bigoted to show any leeway in its position. The EC 
was a group of many countries compared with a singular America. In addition, many 
of them were heavily reliant upon export of their agricultural products. In this respect, 
the former foreign minister of Australia Gareth Evans in those days admitted that the 
CG and the United States worked together against a die-hard Europe rather than 
convincing it tenaciously. Evans notes that “the basic demand- which came to be 
supported by the United States- was for significant movement in all three contested 
areas of agriculture policy: export subsidies, import access and internal support.”55  
As Australia forsook Europe in the end while the country kept the unity of 
the CG persistent, Australia’s legitimacy as a middle power is not necessarily 
clear-cut. This chapter provides us with the two examples; the possibility of middle 
power as a facilitator in the group and the limit of middle power as a negotiator with 
the two rivals at the same time. Whether or not Australian diplomacy was not 
regarded as a middle power theory, it is an essential precedent to compare with the 
Japanese response toward the AFC in the next case study.    
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Chapter 4:  
International Political Economy and Testing Japan’s Response to the 
Asian Financial Crisis 
 The international economy moved back to free trade from bloc economy both 
nominally and virtually when the United States undertook the role of hegemon. The 
international political economy enjoyed a stable period on the whole under the US 
leadership until its junior partners began encroaching on the power monopoly. In this 
chapter, I will take a look at the post-war economic history and position the Japanese 
case study. In addition, I will argue how Japan developed its economic diplomacy 
more successfully as a middle power compared with the Australian case in the 
previous chapter. 
 Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has led the rest of 
the capitalist world as the hegemon. Pax Americana encouraged economically and 
materially devastated states to focus on their own development and the United States 
was willing to assume economic burdens to open its market very generously. Japan 
and West Germany were the biggest beneficiaries to boost their economy under 
American leadership. It was a strategic choice for the United States to hold back key 
allies within the Free World, even though it looked like a kind of favoritism to 
specific countries. Lake states, “when a hegemonic leader exists within the 
international economy, supporters will free-ride, protecting industry at home and 
expanding exports abroad.”56 At the same time, America took the lead of establishing 
international institutions to promote economic development and stabilize international 
economy. While it is the Bretton Woods system that the United States sustained 
which includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group 
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(WB), an International Trade Organization (ITO) was pursued to create the idea of 
free trade. Although America failed to found the initial version, it turned into the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) later in 1947 and eventually World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States 
laid a solid infrastructure for speedy restoration after the Second World War. 
Japan exploited favorable international conditions to rebuild its economy and 
as Japanese businesses returned to Asia, the Japanese government was careful to 
reassure regional countries that the country only had peaceful intentions.  Part of this 
effort to minimize fear and mistrust of Japan was the Fukuda Doctrine issued in 1977, 
to reaffirm Japan’s rejection of military power, promotion of a relationship of mutual 
confidence and trust or heart-to-heart diplomacy, and equal partnership with ASEAN 
for building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia. According to 
Chachavalpongpun, “in essence, his speech indicated that for the first time in the post 
–World War Ⅱ era, Japan was willing to play an active role in both economic and 
political affairs in Southeast Asia without depending on military imperatives and in 
such a way as to make military considerations less prominent.”57 Japan made huge 
progress onward owing to Asia’s positive response thereafter and began working 
together for mutual profits. In addition, the change of foreign industrial policy pushed 
the trend for Japanese firms to get more involved in Asia as a whole. Jomo explains 
that “The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) adopted a 
new Asia Industrial Development (AID) regional policy, encouraging Japanese firms 
to relocate, not only in the East Asian newly industrialized economies of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, but especially in the Southeast Asian MIT 
(Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) newly industrializing countries as well as 
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China.”58 In this context, Southeast Asia came to be a big market for Japanese 
products and base for exporting finished products such as automobiles by late 1990s 
when the crisis hit the region. Hence, Japanese banks had also opened local branches 
along with the current of Japanese business getting into Southeast Asia and began 
paying more attention to the region in proportion to the importance of increasingly 
growing economic dependence. This changing economic structure also meant that 
Asian nations such as Thailand became more and more reliant on Japanese investment. 
As Table 3 shows, the loans from Japan occupied a large share in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, which tells us that those economies were vulnerable depending on the 
gradually declining economy in Japan after its bubble economy collapsed. 
 
 
Table 3 
Sources of External Commercial Bank Debt to End of June 1997 
  Loans (US$ billion) 
% from 
Japan 
% from 
US 
% from 
UK 
% from Rest of Europe 
% from 
Ohters 
Indonesia 58.7  39.4  7.8  7.4  30.9  14.5  
Malaysia 28.8  36.4  8.3  7.0  37.0  11.3  
Philippines 14.1  14.9  20.0  7.6  40.5  17.0  
South 
Korea 
103.4  22.9  9.6  5.9  29.3  32.3  
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Thailand 69.4  54.4  5.8  4.1  24.5  11.3  
Total 274.5  33.6  10.3  6.4  32.4  17.3  
Source: Bank for International Settlements, as cited in FEER 23th July 1998, 38. 
Japan was not the only force to inject financial flow into Asia. Massive and 
rapid financial liberalization attracted a large number of global companies and their 
investment, starting from the 1980s. In fact, other Asian nations such as the Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIES) South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and others had enjoyed a rapid economic boom in the middle of the 1980s to 1997. 
The region was the most prosperous area in the world in those years. When “the East 
Asian Miracle” was applauded by the World Bank in 1993, Asia was at the peak of 
bright optimism.59 Given the fact that the Petronas Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur 
were constructed as the tallest building in the world just after the crisis broke out in 
1998, the 1990s in Asia could be described as an unprecedented boom period. On the 
other hand, the idea that capital market was omnipotent was predominant and pushed 
more risky investment and speculation in many places should also be considered. In 
fact, Lawrence Summers as the U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, who was one 
of the influential men in the international economy, intentionally used a metaphor; 
“global capital markets pose the same kinds of problems that jet planes do. They are 
faster, more comfortable, and they get you where you are going better.”60 As a result, 
a decade-long economic bubble was increasingly inflated by many foreign 
investments and their undue expectation.  
Table 4 
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Investment/GDP (%) 
  1990-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Indonesia 31.3  29.6  28.7  22.1  19.3  
South Korea 36.8  36.8  35.1  29.8  28.0  
Malaysia 37.5  42.5  43.1  26.8  22.3  
Thailand 41.0  41.1  33.3  22.2  21.0  
Source: Jomo Kwame Sundaram in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) 
 
To be fair, it may not be appropriate for us to blame those who were in a state 
of euphoria, because of remarkable economic growth. Even high-ranking officials in 
ASEAN and IMF did not expect that the economic situations would deteriorate so 
quickly. At the time of March 1997, finance ministers in ASEAN were quite 
optimistic about the future outlook of Asian economy in general and even the IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus held shared perspective that the robustness of 
ASEAN economic fundamentals remained intact and still looked sustainably 
hopeful61 until July 1997. As the crisis was as if a big earthquake suddenly hit a place 
where people had previously enjoyed economic prosperity, no one had held a specific 
concern about the economic outlook. Furthermore, even after Thailand’s government 
faced an acute shortage of reserve funds, Indonesia as a potential victim did not take it 
seriously. Ginandjar Kartasasmita as the former Coordinating Minister of Economics, 
Finance, and Industry admitted that, “it was generally believed that Indonesia would 
not suffer the same fate. Indonesia’s economic fundamentals were believed to be 
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strong enough to withstand the external shock of Thailand’s collapse.”62 For that 
reason, only when the bubble burst and hit a country, its people finally realized that 
“investors are not consistently rational, that they do get caught up in financial 
euphoria, and that, when the speculative bubble bursts, many innocent people get hurt.” 
63    
Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Robert Rubin, Secretary 
of the Treasury, and Lawrence Summers were at the forefront of a campaign to blame 
the lack of governance in Asian countries as the cause of the financial crisis. They 
said that pernicious practices such as the ruling family and its hangers-on in Indonesia 
and “chaebol” as a local conglomerate in South Korea were such practices of 
institutions. They had to be reformed. These were symbols of unfairness which was 
deeply rooted in their society, preventing newcomers from starting business to 
encroach on their vested interests and blocked economic reform to open their markets 
and undertake deregulation. Thus, they repeatedly insisted that the old-fashioned 
customs should be replaced with a more equitable business environment. On the other 
hand, there were also those who faced a head-on confrontation with the committee. 
For example, Bhagwati named “the Wall Street-Treasury Complex” as the joint force 
to distort world economy intentionally and criticized the network as the one that is 
“unable to look much beyond the interest of Wall Street, which equates with the good 
of the world”. 64  What he meant is that for their shared goal, the influential 
businessmen and high-ranking officials worked together to remake the rule of the 
game in the name of free market, transparency, deregulation and so on. On the other 
hand, Sakakibara described “the turmoil in Far Eastern economies as "not an Asian 
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crisis, but a crisis of global capitalism."65 As a matter of fact, the financial crisis first 
broken out in Thailand spread over Asian borders and eventually reached Russia and 
Brazil thereafter. Sakakibara attributed the crisis to a liquidity problem, in other words, 
the confusion of foreign exchange markets.66 From all the different viewpoints, it is 
clear that there are various arguments for the reasons of the rapid economic growth in 
Asia and its fall. 
However, perspectives like Sakakibara’s that pay attention to a crisis of 
global capitalism like Sakakibara is the mainstream of the academic world in advance 
of other theories such as “the committee to save the world” and “the Wall 
Street-Treasury Complex”. As a result of rapid economic development, the Asian 
crisis of global capitalism in 1997 was precipitated by excessive borrowings of 
foreign short-term capital based on free capital movement. Hellman defines the AFC 
as “mainstream scholarly literature in the West” explaining it as “simply a severe 
debt-servicing emergency that wreaked havoc in several Asian nations.” 67  In 
addition, Johnson questions the so-called Western blamers regarding rampant 
corruption, on the basis of the same viewpoint for the cause by saying that “Crony 
capitalism is an inadequate explanation for what has happened in East Asia.” 68 In 
this respect, the AFC was not only essentially inherent in Asia. Therefore, it spread to 
Russia and Brazil later. 
 The role of IMF during the Economic crisis was controversial. While the 
United States and IMF justified so-called austerity policy and imposed conditionality 
on Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, Asian countries and many economists 
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insisted that the IMF made the situation worse. Although the IMF seemed to be an 
organization with respectful professionals, the international institution could not 
necessarily dispatch regional experts promptly who were familiar with the countries 
in crisis and tended to espouse one-size-fits-all solutions to all nations universally. For 
example, according to Feldstein the IMF imposed a similar package on different 
nations by saying “the proper remedy is a variant of the traditional IMF medicine 
tailored specifically to each country-some combination of reduced government 
spending, higher taxes, and tighter credit.”69 At another level, there were some in 
Asian countries who actually welcomed the IMF rescue plan. Blustein recounts that 
an Indonesian minister of finance in those days secretly asked the United States and 
IMF to put more pressure for reforms which the minister was trying to implement.70 
The watchdog was very eager to get rid of intrinsic evil practices “KKN (korupsi, 
kolusi, dan nepotisme)” meaning rampant “corruption, collusion and nepotism”. This 
was also the case in South Korea. The ossified economic structure in South Korea 
monopolized by its financial conglomerate “chaebol” was diagnosed by America and 
the IMF as the symbol of crony capitalism which had to be replaced with a fairer 
system. Kim and Park say that “South Korea’s active acceptance of the IMF led 
restructuring started with an intention to promote domestic economic restructuring 
with the use of Western capitalistic authority names IMF.”71 When the crisis hit 
South Korea very seriously in the end of 1997, it was the time for presidential election 
which caused the change of administration. When Kim Dae Jung was elected, even 
the well-known leftist Kim recognized that there was no alternative but to accept the 
IMF rescue plan. 
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Regarding the Asian model in order to boost economy, although the World 
Bank published the report as I mentioned, there was no unanimous consensus about 
the model of the bank. The Washington consensus did not have a great deal of 
legitimacy for Asian countries. Hence there were conflicting opinions even in the 
related parties such as the US Treasury, the World Bank and the IMF. Whereas the 
United States placed importance on governance and liberalization, Asian nations such 
as Japan emphasized a big role of administration. All competed ardently to prove that 
their theories were right respectively. As it was true that Asia emerged economically 
as a promising region, whether American capitalists supported it or not, the bank 
made a decision to examine how economic success was accomplished, provided that 
Japan donated 12 million dollars. It was also a deal for the World Bank that Japan 
would act harmoniously with a deregulation plan the bank devised.72 In this context, 
it was not an easy path until “the East Asian Miracle” was officially approved within 
the bank. Even after the report was published, the Asian developmental model was, 
therefore, the objective to suspect whether the model was the right path to a certain 
extent. There were still viewpoints in western economists that the model was not open, 
free, and transparent, judged against western capitalism.  
True or not, the Asian path for economic development was seen overall as a 
good role model by international institutions in early 1990s and then was highly 
criticized as irresponsible soon after its peak of unstinted praise. Alliance capitalism 
as the alternative to “greedy” American capitalism which originally came from 
“keiretsu” meaning enterprise groups in Japan73 was extended all over Asia and 
regarded as the most successful example. In fact, Vogel extolled its management style 
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of Japanese corporations and the strong role of state such as the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) when 
Japan enjoyed its economic prosperity.74 In this period, the Japanese model swept 
across the world as the successful mold. However, it was turned into “a war criminal” 
responsible for defeat in the moment when the AFC hit Asia exposing negative 
aspects of business practice in this region. For example, keiretsu as a secret of success 
was regarded as an inefficient model while state-led economic structure was blamed 
as a form to produce nontransparent and unfair results. As The Economist points out, 
“these days keiretsu ties are no longer constructive. They are being used to contain 
damage, and are a source of weakness as they slow down change.” 75 As there was 
intrinsically no end to doubts raised concerning the model in the United States and 
international institutions, the reputation was reversed once the situation changed. 
 Whether the cause of the Asian Financial Crisis was the lack of good 
governance in Asian nations or “Manias, Panics and Crashes” of global flow of 
money, the unexpected vulnerability in the international market was suddenly 
exposed in Thailand in July 1997. Strange had warned us about instability of the 
money game a decade earlier, well beyond the massive disruption in the hub of 
manufacturing activity in South East Asia.76 Once it began, its aftereffect quickly 
infected other countries such as South Korea and Indonesia. The crisis damaged those 
countries regardless of the difference of development type; Thailand heavily 
depended on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) while South Korea achieved economic 
development by making use of foreign trade as the lever.77 As Gilpin explains the 
mechanism of financial crisis, when speculators and foreign companies withdrew 
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their investment, in Thailand, the government used up its foreign exchange reserve 
swiftly and was unable to respond effectively to stop the flow. Thailand was as if it 
just stood at a loss for what to do.78 In this context, Japan decided to take the lead for 
rescue package which was, I argue, the first indication of middle power diplomacy. 
Although the process where the AMF plan was turned down was an obvious failure, 
the idea was revived as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Later, the process to start 
over again from failure to the establishment of the CMI was perceived as an example 
of the Japanese experiment in the new diplomatic direction.79   
 America was obviously unwilling to get involved in the multinational rescue 
team given the fact that America did not even pay a cent, as table 6 shows us later. 
The reluctance to initiate the joint effort to save Thailand was in contrast to its 
commitment to save Mexico in 1994, just a few years previously, which is the 
so-called Tequila Crisis. As a matter of fact, the United States Secretary of the 
Treasury Robert Rubin was obviously less active for the Clinton administration to 
initiate an international rescue team for Thailand than Mexico. Even though there was 
a fund at the US Treasury called Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), the Treasurer 
did not want to use it to prop up Bangkok for strategic reasons. According to 
Woodward, “Rubin said at one meeting with Greenspan, look, we do not know what 
is going to happen, but it may be we are going to need that ESF, and if we use it now, 
and Congress actually takes our ability to use it away, then what would happen when 
we really need it?...Rubin wanted to leave Thailand to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and support their efforts. Greenspan agreed.” 80  The lack of US 
commitment disappointed Asian countries. Moreover, the United States blamed Japan 
for its mismanagement of domestic economy after the bubble economy collapsed in 
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the early 1990s and inappropriate stimulus packages to help desperate Asian nations. 
It goes without saying that other Asian countries were also criticized for their poor 
economic management. Sheng describes this cruel response by indicating that “it was 
remarkable that the United States and Europe did not contribute at all but still insisted 
on the principle of transparency that the Bank of Thailand had to reveal.” 81 In 
consequence, Asian states overall recognized harsh and indifferent US attitude 
without specific action to save Asia as a grave betrayal and tried to find a way out of 
financial crisis without American assistance. 
 Second, IMF policy made Asian leaders and policy makers suspect what the 
international organization really wanted. Passive US response made them distrustful 
of the only country which possessed virtual “veto” in the IMF decision making 
process. What the IMF tried to impose on Asia was, from their perspective, actually a 
US intention, manipulating its policy behind the scenes. In fact, the bail-out plan 
required recipients to carry out liberalization of their markets and deregulation to 
invite foreign corporations to advance to them. The fact that Citibank occupied a 
majority share in Thailand was a product coming about from the reform in the wake 
of IMF conditionality, which spurred Thai people to distrust the IMF. Essentially, 
IMF officials failed to offer an effective plan to restore damaged countries and rather 
worsened the crisis. Trimbath explains that “Stanley Fischer, then deputy managing 
director of the IMF, admitted in 1998 that he had underestimated the probability of 
the global capital crisis.” 82 As a result, IMF action led to the view that it was eager 
to break the Asian tradition and restructure the successful Asian developmental model, 
and privately take advantage of the cause of radical reform on purpose to get rid of 
outdated models and corruption. The article “the politics of resentment”, written by 
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Higgott,83 inevitably depicted the image that Asia protested against American inroads 
into the region.     
 On the other hand, the IMF made a definite counterargument toward the 
above notion that the IMF as a US minion tried to transform Asia into a favorable 
environment for business. In fact, the monetary institution asked three Asian countries, 
Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia to implement a series of reforms. It put 
politically heavy pressure to revamp their economic structures by some measures such 
as advancing financial system and closing insolvent banks, although even 
aforementioned IMF high-ranking official Fischer admitted that these requests needed 
dramatic change to be met. The IMF was very consistent with its rigorous attitude all 
along. Fischer demonstrates that “simply letting the chips fall where they may would 
surely cause more bankruptcies, larger layoffs, deeper recessions, and even deeper 
depreciations than would otherwise be necessary to put these economies back on a 
sound footing.” 84 As a major pillar to maintain stable global economy, the IMF 
obviously had no option to leave the matter as it was. Therefore, it could be possible 
from its perspective that IMF volunteered to take on a bad-guy role to restore the 
Asian economy.   
 When Japan proposed that a regional institution for stabilizing financial 
affairs, a so-called Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), needed to be built, Japan did not 
consult with the United States of America. The MOF initiated the plan with strong 
support by then Prime Minister Hashimoto (1996-1998) who also previously served 
as the Minister of Finance (1989-1991), and International Trade and Industry 
(1994-1996). This scheme was without consensus among ministries and private 
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business circles within Japan. Hashimoto was much more used to economic 
diplomacy than previous Prime Ministers, in particular, the international negotiations 
with the United States through vehement trade negotiation and financial cooperation 
during the Gulf War in 1991. Hashimoto testified that Japan should assume a willing 
role willingly to mediate interests in the world without mentioning middle power 
diplomacy and that he personally did not trust IMF measure on Indonesia. For 
example, he said that the type of policy devised for Thailand should not be uniformly 
imposed on Indonesia because of different economic structures and environment in 
both countries; Thailand as a singular land mass and Indonesia as a multitude of 
islands, are completely different.85 If a local bank on an island in Indonesia, for 
example, was closed down for restructuring, the economy and life of the island as a 
whole would come to a standstill. PM Hashimoto was very eager to strengthen the 
regional integration through political, security and cultural ties as well as the rescue 
plan for appeasing economic crisis. Lam Peng Er terms his diplomacy as the 
Hashimoto Doctrine and calls Japanese diplomacy in those days “a Generator of 
Ideas.”86 In short, it may safely be said for Asian nations that Japan was ready to play 
an active part in regional matters. 
 It was beneficial for Japan to initiate the plan whether Japan included the 
United States or not. After the bubble economy collapsed in the early 1990s and the 
outlook of domestic economy was quite uncertain owing to bankruptcy of well-known 
companies, Japan recognized the significance of networks with Asian neighbors to 
take advantage of their emerging national strength. It was an energy-efficient way of 
Japanese diplomacy with relatively less effort. Jain and Stephens named the way as 
network diplomacy and articulate on its usefulness by saying that “Japan uses network 
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diplomacy as an effective foreign policy strategy to help secure its position as an 
influential and respected regional power.”87 The two authors did not mention middle 
power policy. However, the creation of networks set up all over Asia is prerequisite 
factor to develop middle power diplomacy considering the role to lead its coalition for 
influencing great powers with collective voices.     
 There was an argument that the AMF would not maintain appropriate 
conditions to avoid moral hazard which may encourage investors to make 
irresponsible decisions. The discourse was developed that lax standards for urgent 
rescue spoils those who are involved in business and damages the fundamental 
principle of capitalism. Even though there was some truth in that, scholar and policy 
makers in this issue analyzed that the AMF plan led by Japan was a grave threat 
against US hegemony. Stiglitz states that “while the IMF was a strong advocate of 
competition in markets, it did not want competition in its own domain, and the Asian 
Monetary Fund would provide that.”88 This was exactly what the United States 
seemed to comprehend, judging from the long cycle theory advocated by Modelski. 
On the other hand, there was another arguing point about the confrontation 
between Japan and America which was based on the difference of identity. The 
Japanese model with strong and farsighted bureaucracy, in other words a 
developmental state model, shared by countries was the symbol of rapid economic 
development, the so-called East Asian Miracle shared by other countries. However 
the United States thought that the model was a hotbed of crony capitalism preventing 
a fair and open market from being established. To take an illustration, Alan 
Greenspan as the chairman of the Federal Reserve was in the vanguard of criticism 
against the Asian model. According to his testimony in the American national bank, 
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“my sense is that there is a growing understanding and appreciation of the benefits of 
market capitalism as we practice it- that what is being prescribed in IMF programs 
fosters their own interests.”89 While the United States asked Asian nations to reform 
their structure, they felt forcefully pushed to accept the American model. As a result, 
the IMF came to be regarded as a puppet in the hands of America to implement its 
desired policies which were generally based on free market, deregulation policy, 
smaller government, autonomous private business and transparency. According to Lee, 
“the MOF strongly felt the US presence behind the IMF operation, which was 
interpreted to be working in the United States. interest in bringing down the Asian 
model with no appropriate reason to do so.”90 This sentiment was also shared with 
other Asian leaders in those days such as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir. As 
Camdessus, the managing director of the IMF, and Fisher, its deputy director, were 
supportive toward the AMF plan at the outset, there was a consensus among the 
related parties in the dispute that only the United States, as a country owning “virtual 
veto” in the IMF, urged them to change their mind.  
Regardless of whether it was an identity clash, not every Asian country 
agreed with the Japanese initiative which would divide the ties between Asia and the 
United States. Although it was an absolutely unprecedented financial crisis in Asia, 
some countries were much less affected by the monetary storm such as Taiwan and 
mainland China on the grounds that they were not economically dependent on foreign 
money while Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia were in a state of economic 
devastation. Among other things, China and South Korea were opposed to AMF plan. 
Furthermore, Sakakibara infers an anonymous member in Asia informed America of 
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the Japanese plan in secret. He said that after Japan made a tentative overture to 
would-be AMF’s original members, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Summers 
called Sakakibara in a rage in the middle of the night by saying that “I thought you 
were my friend.”91 The leak tells us that some still expected the United States to lead 
Asia or that division between the two regions was not a good idea in the midst of the 
crisis. Bergsten illustrates that “it would be especially foolhardy to risk dividing Asia 
and the Americans at this time of global crisis, with its desperate need for leadership 
from the United States…thoughtful Asians have in fact insisted on American 
participation in any such scheme.”92 While the United States and the IMF were 
harshly blamed, they were also welcomed to a certain extent because of their 
willingness to speak to Asia without reserve about what was necessary to deal with 
the crisis. 
 Fierce opposition from the United States aborted the AMF plan and called 
upon Japan to shift its strategy to a more acceptable framework. It is true that Japan as 
the middle power country tried to coordinate Asian voices about the AMF plan among 
ASEAN members and brought consensus in some degree, but it paid the price for its 
negligence to communicate well with the super power. In addition, Japan was not able 
to clear up misunderstanding of China and failed to persuade South Korea. China was 
promising to develop rapidly at the time of late 1990s, it was very ambitious to play a 
bigger role as a regional leader than an economically declining Japan and wary of 
Japan’s regional strategy. Furthermore, Kim and Park say that “South Korea also took 
tepid position on Japanese proposal for the creation of AMF and in fact expressed 
opposing position.” The two scholars infer that Japanese initiatives “continue its 
patron role of East Asia.”93 As Hefeker and Nabor note, “this prospect (China as the 
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regional dominant economic power) must be taken into consideration when planning 
monetary cooperation.” 94  Therefore, these two nations did not support Japan’s 
proposal despite the worsening depression in Asia. As Carr also stated with regards to 
the hegemonic stability theory, “the working hypothesis of an international order was 
created by a superior power. The hypothesis has been destroyed by the decline, 
relative or absolute, of that power.”95 Japanese diplomacy during the financial crisis, 
as a consequence, was perceived by the United States as a challenge against Pax 
Americana.  
 Although the United States was opposed to the establishment of an “Asian” 
Monetary Fund excluding America, it was not opposed to the regional financial 
cooperation. In fact, Lawrence Summers as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury placed 
more importance on intervention rather than just trusting market mechanisms naively 
and leaving behind desperate countries. According to the Economist, “Summers 
Doctrine fuses microeconomic laissez faire with macroeconomic activism. Markets 
should allocate capital, labor and ideas without interference, but sometimes markets 
go haywire, and must be counteracted forcefully by government.”96  Therefore, 
judging from his economic ideology, the idea to contain causes of crisis through a 
new institution does not necessarily seem to contradict his principle. According to 
Hamanaka despite of the fact that his argument is not mainstream, the real reason 
behind the US opposition was the Japanese challenge to disapprove the membership 
of America in the new organization. As he coined “the politics of membership”, after 
the intense “competition between the Japan-sponsored Asia-only framework and the 
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US-sponsored Asia-Pacific framework”97 and the disposal of the original AMF plan, 
the United States put forth a Manila Framework in November 1997 for regional 
surveillance without including “Asia” or any word to imply removal of the United 
States. An issue of membership to join a new organization is often influenced by 
geopolitical factors rather than economic rationality. At any rate, the framework to 
complement the IMF was the only realistic plan countering the ongoing crisis. 
Therefore, Japan decided to step up to the new proposal by securing effective 
measures for solving the problem. According to the report by Institute for 
International Monetary Affairs (IIMA), Japan accepted the counter-proposal with the 
condition of withdrawing the original AMF plan. As a result, the United States 
promised to arrange the surveillance system and Cooperative Financing Arrangement 
(CFA) in return.98 It was no doubt Japan’s capitulation. However, this is one example 
of middle power diplomacy where Japan changed its strategy flexibly and took profit 
rather than fame, because Japan did not adhere intransigently to its original plan and 
found another way to work with the hegemon. A favorable environment for the 
United States to work without losing face was established after the harsh competition 
and cooperation over the Pacific became much smoother.  
 It could also be added that no states disagreed with the regional rescue 
mechanism once Japan shifted its strategy to coordinate interests with the United 
States. For example, China showed its willingness to make a progress for the financial 
cooperation in Asia even after China smothered Japanese proposal with the United 
States. China did not feel comfortable to hear that Japan would magnify its political 
influence over Asia as China’s traditional sphere of influence. However, it was also 
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true that stable economy in Asia was prioritized for Beijing because its economic 
growth got under way based on the reform and open-door policy and had just restarted 
normal diplomacy escaping from its international isolation after the Tiananmen 
Massacre in 1989. Chinese leaders knew that stable economy in Asian was all about 
its own development, which had to be seamlessly continued.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
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meeting with Chinese leaders in August 1999 and proposed the creation of an Asian 
Monetary Fund. According to him, “both Premier Zhu and President Jiang shared 
Malaysia’s view of the need for new global financial architecture and greater 
transparency of capital flows.”99 As a proof of China’s stance, China participated in 
the CMI framework through the ASEAN plus Three for its own accord. 
  After the Manila Framework was concluded in November 1997, Japan 
quickly moved to the next step. In October 1998, New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI) 
was delivered at the annual meetings of World Bank Group and International 
Monetary Fund. In order to help devastated neighbors such as Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, Japan dealt with the matter by itself by 
announcing its commitment for 30 billion dollars. According to the Foreign Ministry 
of Japan, “15 billion will be made available for the medium to long-term financial 
needs for economic recovery in Asian countries, and another $15 billion will be set 
aside for their possible short-term capital needs during the process of implementing 
economic reform.”100 As this project was swiftly implemented, Shimura states that 
the NMI was positioned as a measure to reconstruct the East Asian economy and 
stabilize its financial market. It could even be said that the Cooperative Financing 
Arrangement (CFA), which was deferred to be effectuated within the Manila 
Framework, was revived as a bilateral support in the new initiative. 101  The 
arrangement is a concerted mechanism to help devastated nations, which enables 
other countries to jointly participate in the rescue program the IMF chiefly 
implements to make up financially for the lack of a plan. In consequence, a country 
that falls into the economic abyss is likely to be supported more quickly and 
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efficiently.  
Another framework to prevent additional crisis and manage it well when it 
actually occurs was invented not only through Japanese initiative but also through 
ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea), that is the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI), now renamed as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The 
multilateralisation of financial cooperation or post-CMI cooperative activity in Asia 
was mainly induced by dropping western influence, especially after the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) originated from the US mortgage-related securities in 2008. As 
the CMI frankly did not satisfy its members enough, it was transformed into the 
CMIM. Grimes describes the CMIM as “a regional bailout fund, or even an Asian 
Monetary Fund in the mold of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).”102 The main 
role of the mechanism is to swap currency quickly among members when another 
crisis breaks out. This was exactly what Kuroda, currently the governor of Bank of 
Japan, insisted on creating. When he was, currently he is the governor of Bank of 
Japan, a high-ranking official at MOF in the late 1990s and early 2000s; he was also 
involved along with Sakakibara in the strenuous efforts to set up the AMF. He 
reckoned that it was indispensable to have a financial cooperation mechanism which 
was supposed to work regionally to assist the IMF on the condition that 
interdependence was increasingly strengthened as any future economic crisis is very 
likely to be contagious quickly and broadly.103 In fact, the managing director of IMF 
Kohler (2000-2004) welcomed the CMI and positioned it as an important function to 
complement IMF regional operations.104  
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On the other hand, the linkage with the IMF tends to accompany a negative 
image on the CMI. The IMF conditionality was automatically supposed to be annexed 
to the CMI program. It was easy to guess, countries such as Thailand, South Korea 
and Indonesia had traumatic memories of the hasty IMF rescue plan. In addition, it 
was very risky for them to ask the IMF for financial help even indirectly because 
people in respective nations did not have a good impression on anything about the 
IMF. For example, South Korea did not contact the IMF but asked the United States, 
China and Japan for financial help directly when another crisis broke out from New 
York in 2008. Terada quotes the former Thai Finance Minister in his paper to mention 
the distrust toward the IMF by saying “the IMF link needs to be modified, otherwise 
countries are likely to bypass CMIM like they bypassed CMI during the global 
financial crisis…it would be best to design the CMIM to be workable given the IMF 
stigma.”105 
The mechanism begun in 2000, expanded step by step and amounted to 240 
billion dollars in 2012. After the CMI developed itself as the CMIM, Pempel 
emphasized that “multilateralization gave the CMIM significant independence from 
IMF conditionality, giving the economies of the region the enhanced security of a 
collective safety net and an enhanced bargaining position in any future negotiations 
with the IMF and global financial houses.”106 Furthermore, Pitakdumrongkit recounts 
the autonomy of the CMIM from the IMF by saying that “the IMF delinked portion 
was raised to 30 percent, meaning that members could draw up to 30 per cent of their 
maximum borrowing amount without requiring IMF lending conditions.”107 A later 
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development of the CMIM is the ASEAN plus Three Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO) which was established in 2011 and to conduct macroeconomic 
monitoring and analysis on East Asian economies. The AMRO is an independent 14 
member unit and is expected to help CMIM decision-making (ASEAN plus Three and 
Hong Kong). Its Director Nemoto declares that “AMRO will help safeguard the 
ASEAN plus Three countries from global challenges and ensure their economic 
prosperity by effectively detecting such risks and contributing to the swift 
implementation of remedial actions and effective decision-making of the CMIM.”108 
Regional financial multilateralisation has gradually been developed through the 
ASEAN plus Three mechanisms. 
This process and outcome was the crystallization of ASEAN plus Three as 
the new framework. Because Japan gave priority to results rather than mere title as the 
founder of AMF plan, it functioned positively bringing in China and South Korea. 
This was exactly a part of middle power diplomacy which took advantage of the 
ASEAN plus Three’s framework as a legacy of the Hashimoto doctrine in 1997 and 
changed the strategy flexibly not to stand out as a leader but to materialize the end to 
create the CMI. Soeya’s argument is extremely thought-provoking in regard to 
Japanese diplomacy during the crisis, by saying that “the concept of middle-power 
cooperation might provide a clue. Japan must recognize that it will be a truly equal 
partner with other Asian countries in the Asian century.”109 Until the end of bubble 
economy in the early 1990s, Japan ran without stopping in the process of rapid 
economic development and played a role as a successful developmental model for 
neighboring nations. However, once a dark sign began to be seen in the Japanese 
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economic prosperity which overwhelmed others and the “ex-students” emerged 
inversely one after another, the power balance in Asia transformed. Henceforth, it was 
indispensable for Japan to pursue becoming an equal partner with other Asian 
countries. In sum, the regionally independent institution the original AMF envisaged 
to stabilize international economy against the financial crises was, as a consequence, 
remade as a form being more or less intact. Therefore, the AMF plan needs to be 
observed not as the original package but as its whole process. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Members of Asian Groups 
No. Members Asian Monetary Fund  Manila Framework Group  Chiang Mai Initiative 
1 Japan 〇 〇 〇 
2 China × 〇 〇 
3 South Korea × 〇 〇 
4 ASEAN 〇 〇 〇 
5 Hong Kong △ 〇 × 
6 Australia △ 〇 × 
7 The US × 〇 × 
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8 IMF × 〇 × 
 
It was arguably remarkable for Japan to reach the conclusion where the swap 
system was set up with ASEAN and its two East Asian neighbors because the 
collective unit as the ASEAN plus Three had two advantages. Whereas it could 
sidestep direct confrontation stemming from regional distrust among China, Japan and 
South Korea, it was possible for ASEAN to bring the three states into this framework 
to work out problems together as partners impartially. As Grimes reminds us, “the two 
states (China and Japan) compete for regional leadership and in which the basic 
problem of mistrust has limited the scope and effectiveness of regional 
cooperation.”110 In addition, the ASEAN plus Three was fairly a convenient scheme 
bearing in mind that the original AMF plan was rejected by the United States and IMF 
“with the support of China and South Korea, which were afraid of Japanese regional 
ambitions.”111 In this regard, the existence of Japan in the group did not have to be 
highlighted too much. On the other hand, it was favorable for the ASEAN in working 
with the three East Asian countries. Although the ASEAN made great progresses to 
add more members and integrated itself in 1990s, the Asian Financial Crisis 
astonished its members as a harsh wake-up call. It demonstrated its vulnerability 
despite the process to unify, which revealed that the ASEAN was much more fragile 
internally than it seemed externally. Hence, China, Japan and South Korea were 
strong backers to make up for the lack of the organization.   
In order for the ASEAN plus Three to be founded, Japan made a positive 
approach to the ASEAN. The ASEAN plus Three as the framework to collaborate was 
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not originally the expected style for Japan, because Prime Minister Hashimoto 
proposed in January 1997 that Japan and the ASEAN would hold regular summit 
meetings when he visited South East Asia. The ASEAN in turn invited the other two 
states as well as Japan in order to have a meeting in December 1997. Japan decided to 
make use of the opportunity rather than adhering to its own suggestion because the 
new group to discuss regional problems appeared a very convenient framework, 
which was very business-oriented and not tightly binding to members. In the wake of 
the process, Japanese Prime Ministers, Hashimoto and his successor Obuchi, visited 
the region six times thereafter from 1997 to 2000 in the incipient stage of the regional 
cooperation toward the financial crisis.112 As they were quite frequent visitors, it tells 
us how effective the framework was for Japan to implement its diplomacy. It 
functioned well to coordinate various interests among the members, which was 
optimal for the middle power policy. 
Japan played a vital part as a middle power country in the process to restore 
regional economy from the inception of the crisis. Japan made contributions by 
leading coordination with neighbors, technical assistance, leadership determination 
and regional representation on behalf of Asia. First, Japan hosted an international 
conference in August 1997 in order to offer Thailand an urgent relief fund which 
essentially amounted to 17.2 billion dollars. It was strikingly devoted indeed because 
the emergency meeting was convened in August 1997 soon after the financial crisis 
erupted in July 1997 from Bangkok. Japan initiated the discussion by bearing 40 
billion dollars alone in its early stages, which encouraged other rich Asian states, such 
as Singapore, in table 6, to donate and as a result paved the way for Asian nations to 
follow the trend to contain the crisis. Even though the total amount of funds could not 
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meet the actual cost, it obviously revealed that Japan was the only country to lead the 
rest of Asian states in terms of its will and capacity, while the United States was 
extremely reluctant to take the lead for the regional stabilization as a hegemon.   
 
Table. 6 
Composition of the Thai rescue package 
  Amount of fund (Billion$) 
Share 
(%) 
Japan 4 23.3 
Singapore 1 5.8 
Australia 1 5.8 
Malaysia 1 5.8 
Hong Kong 1 5.8 
China 1 5.8 
South Korea 0.5 2.9 
Brunei 0.5 2.9 
Indonesia 0.5 2.9 
IMF 4 23.3 
World Bank  
2.7 15.7 
Asian Development Bank 
66 
 
The United States 0 0 
Total 17.2 100 
Source: IMF and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  
Second, Japan had a more advanced and experienced bureaucracy than other 
Asian nations as a model of Asian development. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
had put forward a ‘Look East Policy’ to emulate Japan over Western-style economic 
management. Although they had imitated Japan’s successful model of developmental 
state which achieved miraculous restoration from ruins after the Second World War, 
other Asian states were not well prepared to face such an unprecedented crisis. The 
financial crisis was too complex for them to respond. Therefore, Japan played a role 
as a mentor. Manupipatpong demonstrates that “to facilitate this (exchanging 
information on short-term capital flows) Japan has been providing technical assistance 
to some member countries to improve their monitoring, collection, and reporting 
system on capital flows, with an emphasis on short-term flows.” 113  This was 
necessary cooperation for all related parties to share the same extent of awareness and 
work together smoothly, which reminds us that Australia also offered technical 
assistance to fellow members in the Cairns Group during GATT Uruguay Round.    
Third, a leader’s commitment is not a peripheral element as a driving force to 
get things done. As Australian Prime Ministers Hawke and Keating were invariably 
determined to keep the Cairns Group unified during GATT Uruguay Round, firm 
commitment of a leader in a mediating state on issues influences the rest of members 
to fulfill the objective by maintaining solidarity. In this sense, Japanese Prime 
Minister Hashimoto in those days was a good example. He initiated the formation of 
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collective framework for dialogue with ASEAN, which expanded into the ASEAN 
plus Three in December 1997 amid the crisis. It was originally proposed to hold 
regular meetings exclusively with Japan, but as a consequence China and South Korea 
were added in the scheme. In order to address the financial crisis in tandem with all 
Asia, the ASEAN plus Three was a really favorable structure not to put China on the 
alert for Japanese hegemony in Asia. As Bi explains, “initially, China was skeptical of 
the original AMF proposal, fearing a Japanese quest for regional dominance. Later, in 
1999, China changed its position, adopting an open attitude toward the proposal.”114 
Moreover, Hashimoto was eager to mediate interests between Indonesia and the IMF. 
After special envoy Mondale, the former US vice president under the Carter 
administration, failed to persuade President Suharto in March 1998, Hashimoto 
decided to visit him voluntarily in Jakarta and successfully convinced him to act in 
concert with the IMF after almost three hours of meeting. Kartasasmita recalls that the 
Prime Minister was in frequent contact with the President to exchange ideas during 
the crisis.115 Even though Ikenberry and Mastanduno mention that “state actors are 
rationally seeking to maximize their national interests,”116 the process to do so is not 
necessarily in a straight line. The way to harmonize the group as a whole is also 
possible, which is a more suitable method for a middle power country to lead 
members and maximize their national interests in the end.  
In the process of materializing the AMF plan, Japan did not notify America 
at first and then changed the strategy to work together. Although Japan made a 
consensus with ASEAN members for the original plan, it was foiled in the attempt to 
get approval from the United States, the IMF, South Korea and China. Japan 
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conceived that it was integral to share the aim with the United States and draw in the 
hegemon. This was the time that the concept of the fund transformed from the 
intra-regional framework to the broader scheme over the Pacific Ocean. Hamanaka 
wraps up the power balance in the area by saying that “it is reasonable to conclude 
that whether the United States supported the creation of a regional monetary fund 
depends on whether it included the United States or not.” 117  Australia as a 
coordinator of the Cairns Group chose the United States to work with, so did Japan to 
get the AMF plan back on the track. Looking back on Asian recent history about 
regionalism, new organizations such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also included America as a watchdog. In the 
context of connecting regional interests with the hegemonic country, collaboration 
between a region and the hegemon is indispensable. Moreover, it is the middle power 
country that coordinates between members and the hegemon persistently. Judging 
from a series of observations on Japanese responses during the Asian financial crisis, 
the conclusion is that Japan played a coordinating role as the middle power.   
Japanese diplomacy during the AFC was not a single path but more like a 
successive modification of a planned course of action in reality. For example, the 
CMI was a product of windfall because the new framework ASEAN plus Three 
invented during the crisis was used as the umbrella; that is, the whole process was 
trial and error. However, Japan constantly maintained its position in the center of the 
coalition and consistently coordinated interests among the members and with the 
hegemon. Therefore, the diplomacy Japan unfolded corresponded exactly with the 
middle power policy. 
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Chapter 5-Conclusion 
 The hegemonic country always cares how it can maintain its power 
supremacy over other influential powers in history. The British felt threatened against 
emerging Germany in chase of Empire when Germany finally overtook Britain in 
industrial power. When the United States as its replacement after the war was also 
rapidly pursued by Japan and the West Germany, the hegemon figured out that two 
chasers were not junior partners but serious competitors for America. It was, therefore, 
no surprise that the upshot of the matter was that the example to create an AMF in 
1997 caused fear to infringe upon American hegemony as well as the current 
expanding China. Although Japan did not intentionally violate the tacit law not to lay 
down a challenge to the US hegemony in their international relations, the Japanese 
action was interpreted as a grave challenge because Japan did not notify the United 
States of the original AMF plan in the early stage. This perspective is the shared view 
among scholars in the international political economy. 
 The immediate US rejection of the AMF plan was an unexpected blow to 
Japan, but Japan took advantage of the opportunity to restructure its diplomacy for 
more acceptable architecture between the Asian countries led by Japan and the United 
States. While Japan failed to win America over to an AMF framework, the country 
solidified ties with its Asian neighbors steadily through the rescue plan for Thailand 
which went into bankruptcy in July 1997. As table 6 shows us, Hashimoto 
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administration successfully put together donations from respective nations into the 
17.2 billion dollar package without American participation. It is safe to argue that 
Japan gained in confidence and Asian countries especially Thailand felt convinced 
that Japan could play a role of active coordinator when the United States did not 
support Asia. In fact, there was an emotional uplift among policy makers in Asia 
while they were working together. As Lipscy quotes a remark from Sakakibara, when 
the international conference for helping Thailand took place in August 1997, “he 
asserts that an “Asian sense of solidarity” pervaded this meeting and became a key 
factor in his decision to promote the AMF plan.”118 From this meeting the MOF 
began persuading Asian countries to join an AMF but the success made Japan 
conceited. This was the wrong perception for the failure to pass the original AMF 
plan for Japanese diplomacy in summer 1997. 
The Japanese government did not seriously consider how the United States 
would respond to a blueprint for a new international financial organization without 
American involvement. It was an imprudent process for Japan to discuss the AMF 
plan as a new international institution among only some Asian nations and give 
misperception to the United States. As a result, Japan learned the lesson to work with 
the hegemon. As a matter of fact, the United States did not intend to refuse any 
collaborative work to stabilize the Asian economy but only to sabotage any plan 
which might have encroached upon U.S. supremacy. As Nye and Welch argue, “fears 
of an economic domino effect in which collapse of some developing economies 
would undermine confidence in others meant that the United States and other 
advanced economies could not continue to stand idly by.”119 Looking back on the 
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process of the AMF package as a whole, this stumble was the turning point where 
Japan adopted middle power diplomacy in terms of close cooperation with the 
hegemonic predominance.  
It was middle power policy Japan developed during the Asian Financial 
Crisis, even though Japan did not pursue the middle power diplomacy actively. No 
one in the Japanese government in those days uttered “middle power” as its official 
diplomatic policy. Japan was the second biggest economy in the world and much 
more economically influential in Asia though the economic bubble had already burst 
when the AFC hit Thailand. To be more precise, judging what contribution Japan 
made during the crisis is exactly applicable to the role of the middle power country 
defined in this thesis. As Soeya argues that “in the case of Japan, however, both 
external and domestic observers have largely neglected the fact that an imbalance 
exists among these three factors (behavior, status and strategy); Japan’s diplomatic 
behavior has essentially reflected ‘middle-power internationalism’, while its status has 
been uncertain and its strategy confused or non-existent”.120 This is the feature of 
Japanese middle power. 
In the post Second World War era, the United States rebuilt devastated 
countries in the Western Europe and Asia, established international institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank and took on more burdens to maintain the 
international economy and reinforce political unity in the free world. Lake 
demonstrates that “the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank, and many United Nations 
organizations all give concrete- and lasting- substance to America’s global economic 
leadership. As a result, international liberalism has been institutionalized in 
international relations.” 121  The United States overwhelmed its junior partners 
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militarily and economically as a supreme ruler in the world. However, once new 
economic powers like West Germany and Japan reemerged, America’s lead had 
diminished step by step. It became quite obvious that the United States continued to 
weaken compared with those nations. This transformation of power balance required a 
new actor. That is not “a supporter” but “a middle power” country to lead its partners 
for a shared purpose.  
A supporter holds up a hegemon but does not pick up voices from small and 
medium sized nations whereas a middle power is a concept to lead those relatively 
weaker countries. A middle power is supposed to coordinate various interests among 
other members, put them together, and convince the hegemonic leader. In the time 
immediately after the Second World War, no one argued the importance of a middle 
power thesis, but more and more states participated increasingly in the international 
regime. The newcomers were seriously seeking a way to reflect their desires on the 
US-led free trade negotiation. When GATT Uruguay Round opened by adopting 
agriculture as a new agenda, the number of members was 123, a new record in the 
history of the regime. Therefore, it was an inevitable trend that Australia as a 
relatively wealthier and more experienced country was expected to organize the 
Cairns Group responsibly to bargain with agricultural giants; The United States and 
European Community. This was the curtain rise for the middle power in the 
international political economy. 
 What are the commonalities and differences between Japan and Australia as 
middle powers? Both Japan and Australia were stronger economies when the Cairns 
Group was formed and the financial crisis drove Thailand into bankruptcy. While 
Australia initiated establishing the group, set the agenda to push and maintained the 
solidarity by the end of the Uruguay Round, Japan took a lead to save Thailand and 
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was consistent all along to stabilize the Asian economy. Although Japan failed to get 
the original AMF plan approved by the United States, it was persistently involved in 
successive schemes such as the Manila Frame Work, the New Miyazawa Initiative 
and the Chiang Mai Initiative. According to Kikuchi, the CMI was proposed by Japan 
in order to create a currency swap system during the ASEAN plus Three’s conference 
which took place in 2000.122 In this respect, it is safe to say that Japan was also 
actively engaged in the AMF plan as a whole.   
The only thing to diverge between the two countries stems from the endgame 
of the negotiation. Both Japan and Australia successfully prevented members from 
defecting and coordinated interests within the respective group. While Australia kept 
agriculture as the sole agenda in the Cairns Group, Japan worked together with its 
Asian neighbors and cooperated additionally with China and South Korea in the new 
framework ASEAN plus Three after the original AMF plan was rejected. As Japan 
could not persuade China and South Korea to stick to the original plan, it paid more 
careful attention to the consolidation of the group in the second half of the game. 
Australia did not mediate interests with the European Community because the lucky 
country chose the United States to conclude the deal. The deal was made between the 
Cairns Group and the United State due to the fact that the EC was so intransigent that 
the Cairns Group gave up on agreement. On the other hand, as Japan was in charge of 
collaborating with the United States until the currency swap system materialized, the 
two conclusions formed a striking contrast. Judging from the two conclusions, I argue 
that Australia was not able to play a middle power role fairly. This is the deference 
between Japan and Australia. What I do argue instead is, therefore, that Japan was the 
more successful as a middle power than Australia was in terms of fairness. 
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Regarding the guiding principle of Japanese diplomacy during the AFC and 
the way for the policy to restore the Asian economy, in conclusion, I can argue that 
Japan responded to the Asian Financial Crisis as a middle power country. In addition, 
the country mediated mutual interests between Asia and the United States in order to 
stabilize the highly damaged Asian economy and prevent a recurrence of another 
crisis.  
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